

Managed retreat as a response to natural hazard risk

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Managed retreat is a potentially important climate change adaptation option, providing an alternative to structural protection or accommodation measures to manage natural hazard risk. However, its application faces challenges given the projected scale of climate-induced displacement and the difficulties of resettlement. We evaluate the drivers, barriers and outcomes of 27 recent cases of managed retreat that have resettled approximately 1.3 million people. A conceptual model based on two key factors—who benefits from retreat and who initiates it—organizes the diverse set of cases into four quadrants. Different sociopolitical dimensions emerge as particularly influential in each quadrant. The model establishes a foundation for understanding and anticipating case-specific complexities. It can be used to unpack the landscape of managed retreat and evaluate its potential future applications.

Changing climatic hazards are already driving migration and community relocation globally, and by 2100, sea level rise alone threatens to displace 72–187 million people¹. Risk management approaches are needed to support the millions of people exposed to potential displacement. Accommodating such risks has limits, and structural protective measures (for example, levees) involve high maintenance costs, environmental damage, and increased development in hazardous locations^{2,3}.

One alternative is managed retreat, the strategic relocation of structures or abandonment of land to manage natural hazard risk. Often considered transformational adaptation, managed retreat brings its own set of challenges, whether political, social, or legal. It has yet to be widely analysed or adopted; still, examples are beginning to accumulate⁴.

We document, analyse, and compare 27 past and ongoing efforts to implement managed retreat across the globe. This is the first study to synthesize a wide-ranging set of empirical evidence on managed retreat. Over the past three decades, approximately 1.3 million people have relocated through managed retreat (Supplementary Table 1), which pales in comparison to this century's projected displacements.

We develop a conceptual model representing core interactions across the comprehensive data set as a foundation for understanding recent and future applications of managed retreat. The model identifies key sociopolitical attributes likely to promote or impede adoption of managed retreat. Across diverse settings, it can assist researchers and practitioners evaluating if and how to implement managed retreat. Overall, our approach complements physical-science and economics methods in supporting management of natural hazard risk in a changing climate.

Challenges implementing managed retreat

Although applications of managed retreat vary widely, existing studies have focused on only one or a few cases at a time. These studies provide limited cross-cutting insight about the use of managed retreat as a risk management strategy. Further, global coastal-adaptation models generally omit retreat and focus only on structural protective measures, or they use economic efficiency

rules to differentiate between protection and retreat^{4,5}. By contrast, our study integrates across all available cases in the literature and examines social, political and economic influences.

Retreat has long been acknowledged as an alternative to coastal protection, appearing as such in the IPCC's First Assessment Report in 1990 (ref. 6). 'Retreat' is used to capture the philosophy of moving away from the coast rather than fortifying in place⁴. 'Managed retreat', on the other hand, derives from coastal engineering and has been defined as 'the application of coastal zone management and mitigation tools designed to move existing and planned development out of the path of eroding coastlines and coastal hazards'⁷. The term has also been used to describe the landward relocation of riverine flood defence structures^{8,9}. We identify two defining features of managed retreat in coastal and other settings. First, it is a deliberate intervention intended to manage natural hazard risk, requiring an implementing or enabling party. Second, it involves the abandonment of land or relocation of assets. We use those characteristics to define managed retreat as the strategic relocation of structures or abandonment of land to manage natural hazard risk.

Managed retreat has been used only in limited fashion to date. Past work has identified a number of reasons why its usage has been relatively scarce, despite potential economic and broader benefits.

First, managed retreat is often controversial because of the social and psychological difficulties in displacing people from their homes, 'the central reference point of the human existence'^{10,11}. Other social and emotional attributes, such as attachment to place, perceptions of the potential destination, and economic prospects, also shape attitudes toward retreat¹². Managed retreat is not a low-regrets option, nor is it easily reversed. Intangible costs, such as cultural-heritage loss, can be particularly high with retreat, and decision-makers may shy away from the potential political contention^{8,13}.

Another key obstacle is the 'levee effect' feedback loop: once structural protection is built, development tends to increase behind it, amplifying motivation for its continuation¹⁴. In Australia and the US, local governments have encountered legal challenges when trying to cease maintenance of defences^{15,16}. Without adequate foresight, incremental protection measures may decrease the feasibility of subsequent retreat³.

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Managed retreat is spatially and economically different from many other risk management measures. The benefits of protection and accommodation measures largely accrue where they are implemented, whereas retreat in one location can benefit other linked, exposed areas, such as in the Netherlands (Supplementary Table 2, Example 6)¹⁷. Unlike engineering measures with ongoing maintenance costs, retreat once implemented involves minimal recurring financial costs while permanently reducing natural hazard risk. The timescale and discount rates used in cost–benefit analysis therefore affect the ranking of coastal management measures; one study found that retreat tends to be favoured over timescales greater than 25 years¹⁸.

Documenting recent experiences with managed retreat

To compile a comprehensive database of recent efforts to implement managed retreat, we searched for ‘managed retreat,’ ‘community relocation,’ ‘climate displacement,’ ‘island abandonment,’ and ‘planned resettlement’ in the peer-reviewed literature and in reports from governments, development agencies, and research organizations. Our definition of managed retreat (see Methods) excludes resettlement driven by mining, dams, or general development objectives. The definition also requires at least two parties, an implementing or enabling party and the residents affected by the intervention because they are relocating or because their assets are moved or altered in land abandonment. We include any instance in which one party initiates retreat, regardless of whether retreat has taken place. Only sufficiently documented examples could be analysed, so smaller-scale and developing country examples especially may have been missed.

The 27 cases identified, described in Supplementary Table 2, capture the large majority of well-documented managed-retreat examples involving two or more parties. They originate in 22 countries spanning all major world regions, occur in pre- and post-disaster settings, and address tropical storms, flooding, erosion, earthquakes and tsunamis. The cases are either one-time interventions or programs that have conducted multiple interventions.

This diversity of applications includes several distinct clusters of interventions, such as numerous examples of post-disaster mandatory relocations and locally driven relocation efforts. To understand what drove these discrepancies, we sought to identify criteria that could map the full range of cases while reflecting fundamental differences among clusters. Data on many potential distinguishing factors were assembled to enable systematic cross-case comparison¹⁹. Our analysis of these various factors revealed that managed-retreat processes were most fundamentally shaped by the relationship and interactions of the two parties involved.

Conceptual model development

We use the two parties’ motivations to structure a conceptual model encompassing documented experiences with managed retreat. The model serves as a point of departure for unpacking case-specific complexities. By enabling comparison among vastly different applications, it lays the groundwork for deeper investigation of the various factors shaping the process of managed retreat, such as power dynamics between parties.

In the conceptual model (Fig. 1), the residents’ initial willingness to move is reflected in the horizontal axis. Either the residents (those who would be moving) initiate the move, or they do not. On the right-hand side, residents initiate and thus support the move; on the left-hand side, residents do not initiate retreat. The vertical axis encompasses the implementing party’s motivation to support managed retreat. The implementing party, often a government entity, represents a broader group of constituents. It is therefore more likely to support retreat when benefits are perceived for that group. The broader group’s benefits may include reduced expenditure on disaster relief, improved environmental




Figure 1 | Conceptual model of managed retreat. The horizontal and vertical axes reflect the perspectives of the residents and implementing party, respectively.

protection, or reduced exposure to natural hazards. Because the vertical axis is defined in our model from the perspective of the implementing party, it does not necessarily align with the perspective of constituents who might or might not move. For example, an implementing party may define broader benefits on the basis of environmental justice, or in a way that does not account for the importance of a sense of home. The positions of both parties depend on their values and perceived risk levels. Accordingly, different values and misperceptions can affect where each party locates within the model and contribute to misaligned perspectives. Both axes are treated as gradients rather than discrete categories to reflect the nuance and complexity associated with each case.

These two axes create four quadrants. In the top-right quadrant, Mutual Agreement, residents initiate retreat and the implementing party likely supports it. In the top-left quadrant, residents do not initiate the move, but broader society would benefit, so the implementing party is motivated to support retreat. Interventions in this Greater Good quadrant often resemble exercises of eminent domain, similar to dam-related resettlements, and may require substantial incentives to persuade residents to relocate. In the bottom-left quadrant, Hunkered Down, residents do not initiate retreat, and broader society benefits little. Managed retreat may occur in such a situation due to other motivating factors, differences between the two parties’ valuations of costs and benefits, or misperceptions by either party. Finally, in the bottom-right Self Reliance quadrant, residents support managed retreat, but the implementing party has little incentive to do so.

Understanding recent experiences with managed retreat

Recent experiences demonstrate how each party’s motivations shape the processes and outcomes of managed retreat. Each case or cluster of cases is mapped onto the conceptual model in Fig. 2, indicating how the two parties’ perspectives vary across the landscape of examples. Supplementary Table 2 provides details for each case.

Post-disaster voluntary relocation programs fall in the Mutual Agreement quadrant because both parties are likely to support implementation of retreat. For example, the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) finances property buyouts through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) (Supplementary Table 2, Example 1). After a disaster, owners of high-risk properties are offered buyouts at the house’s pre-disaster market value, and




Figure 2 | Managed-retreat conceptual model with recent examples mapped into their respective quadrants. Circles denote sets of cases, and crosses represent single cases. Circle sizes are proportional to the number of cases except for autonomous migration, which falls outside our analysis. The number of people is the approximate number resettled to date. For additional detail on the cases included and the estimated number resettled, see Supplementary Tables 1 and 2.

the property is restored to open space. Benefit–cost ratios for these interventions range between 2 and 5 depending on the types of benefits monetized^{20,21}. In some cases (for example, Lockyer Valley, Australia), relocation decisions have been made at the community, rather than household, level (Supplementary Table 2, Example 3)²². Most of these interventions have resettled tens to hundreds of households at a time; their voluntary nature can limit their scale.

In Mutual Agreement, aligned interests between parties help overcome regulatory obstacles. For example, in Lockyer Valley, land use change that ‘would normally have taken between two and three years to plan and permit was accomplished in four months’²³. Although widespread agreement advances implementation for this quadrant, resident perspectives can vary within interventions²⁴. Some households may initially oppose relocation but concede upon realizing much of their community is moving. Time required to process resettlement can be an obstacle; hesitant residents may find it easier to rebuild and return home than to wait for finalization of the buyout or relocation. Although residents must choose to relocate, the implementing party’s support facilitates the retreat process.

Greater Good managed-retreat interventions are driven by a motivated implementing party, which often must overcome initial resident opposition by incentivizing or compelling relocation. As part of the Netherlands’ Room for the River program, years of debate between residents, scientists, and government agencies culminated in the decision to lower dykes around the De Noordwaard community, creating a floodplain for high river flows and protecting downstream settlements (Supplementary Table 2, Example 6). The government negotiated with each of 75 affected households, offering to buy out or elevate their homes¹⁷. In this case, the community’s displacement reduced risk for a much larger population.

Similar compensation for affected residents features in managed realignment projects, in which embankments are removed or shifted inland to restore wetlands and reduce spending on coastal

defences. The UK and Germany have implemented dozens of these projects over the past several decades (Supplementary Table 2, Examples 7 and 8)²⁵. Residents are not displaced but may lose land to realignment. Comprehensive cost and benefit data are lacking, but one such project has been shown to be cost-effective given avoided coastal defence spending and environmental benefits¹⁸.

In Hunkered Down, residents do not initially support retreat, and broader society benefits little from its implementation. For example, in the UK Coastal Change Pathfinder Programme, five local councils relocated or bought out households at high risk from coastal hazards (Supplementary Table 2, Example 22). The residents were offered financial and regulatory relocation support to incentivize their move. However, an ex post analysis concluded that societal costs exceeded benefits for several of the interventions (although it did not consider the benefits of reduced urban blight or other local social and environmental improvements)²⁶. The implementing party’s decision to implement retreat may have been driven by mistaken perceptions about its costs and benefits or by other non-economic benefits.

Almost half of the cases are categorized as mandatory resettlement projects. The benefits of such interventions are often hotly debated, so their location on the vertical axis is uncertain. Resident reactions are typically negative, varying with resident circumstances, relocation destination, and retreat process²⁷. These mandatory resettlements are generally very large in scale, sometimes aiming to move hundreds of thousands of people (see Supplementary Table 1). Because of resident opposition and scale, these interventions have encountered numerous logistical and political challenges. After the tsunami in 2004, the Sri Lankan government prohibited rebuilding in the coastal zone (Supplementary Table 2, Example 19). However, an opaque process, redefinitions of the coastal zone, and lack of trust in the government hampered implementation. Some ultimately moved back to the coastal zone while others lacked permanent housing for many months or years²⁸.

For Hunkered Down and Greater Good cases, the enabling driver is the implementing party's commitment and capacity to relocate residents despite public resistance, complexities of mobilizing and disbursing funds, and the challenges of determining who moves where. These projects often require coordination across numerous institutions and door-to-door engagement. Nonetheless, in all cases in these two quadrants, much of the target population was relocated due to the implementing party's political will and authority.

The Self Reliance quadrant comprises several examples of residents struggling to persuade an implementing party to support relocation. The Alaskan villages of Newtok, Shishmaref and Kivalina have long sought relocation assistance from the national government (Supplementary Table 2, Example 24). Although previously seasonally migratory, these communities began to settle in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to meet government requirements that their children attend formal schools. The school sites, selected by the US Department of the Interior, led to the tribes' settlement locations. Since then, erosion and flooding have plagued the villages, and each community has decided collectively to relocate. But the villages can only access funds on a competitive basis, in part because these repetitive events do not have the recognition of a presidential disaster declaration. Relocation in such remote locations has a low benefit–cost ratio, and the villages have not been able to fund their relocation thus far²⁹. Similarly self-driven, the Pacific island country of Kiribati has sought to enable migration of its residents through bilateral agreements with other nations as well as vocational programs that enhance employment opportunities abroad (Supplementary Table 2, Example 25)³⁰.

In contrast to the other quadrants, Self Reliance cases have largely failed to resettle the target populations. In addition to financial barriers, residents face legal and institutional obstacles; in the US, for example, no single agency has responsibility to implement the Alaskan villages' relocations²⁹. Unlike the Mutual Agreement quadrant, the residents' choosing to relocate is not sufficient for retreat to take place. Instead, residents in Self Reliance cases have fought for tailored solutions for their specific circumstances. For example, after over a decade of discussions with the US government, the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe in southern Louisiana was able to obtain \$50 million for resettlement from the National Disaster Resilience Competition (Supplementary Table 2, Example 27)³¹. These cases demonstrate that small-scale efforts to retreat are not necessarily simpler or easier to achieve than large-scale ones. However, bottom-up efforts with strong community ownership can create customized solutions that top-down interventions may not.

Autonomous environmental migration, also called forced displacement, was not a focus of analysis because it does not strictly meet our definition of managed retreat (see Methods). Because it is resident-initiated, we place it on the right side of our model. However, its vertical-axis location is uncertain. Those moving perceive that the benefits of relocation exceed the costs, but broader societal benefits depend on the origin and destination for each migration context^{32,33}.

In evaluating these interventions based on available documentation, we can objectively observe the extent to which managed retreat took place. Whether retreat 'should' have taken place and whether it was 'successful' are more difficult to assess. No single quadrant can be defined as 'successful' climate change adaptation, as different groups experience the same intervention in distinct ways. At a minimum, arguably successful adaptation can be found in each quadrant because achieving a specific risk-reduction objective is expected through resettlement.

Lessons from recent experiences

Values, goals and worldviews determine whether or not residents initiate retreat, as well as the implementing party's motivation

to support retreat. Residents may oppose retreat despite severe natural hazard risk because of cultural heritage or access to coastal resources; on the other hand, if a destination can preserve valued features, retreat may become more acceptable. The implementing party's values—shaped by its constituent groups—define perceived benefits and costs of retreat. Both parties' viewpoints may evolve over time.

Different sociopolitical dimensions emerge as particularly influential in each quadrant of the conceptual model (Fig. 3). We discuss several salient dimensions here, while underscoring that each case has unique drivers and influences (for example, as illustrated in Fig. 4).

In Mutual Agreement, when the relocation choice is largely left to residents, place attachment and community networks strongly affect the final outcome. At the household or individual level, attachment to place has shaped responses to environmental change and choices regarding risk management^{34,35}. Broader social dynamics matter too: after Hurricane Sandy, household- and individual-level characteristics had only a weak influence on the choice to accept or reject a buyout¹². Rather, the stronger influence was whether or not neighbours were relocating.

For Greater Good interventions, the implementing party's capacity, political will, and power emerge as key influences because it is involved in virtually every step of the process. The implementing party determines who moves, addresses permitting or regulatory issues, and constructs new housing. These interventions are similar to development-driven resettlements, and many of the same risks and lessons that have emerged from those programs apply³⁶. For example, the post-tsunami intervention in Sri Lanka demonstrates how insufficient community engagement and weak enforcement can impair retreat efforts (Supplementary Table 2, Example 19). In contrast, after Tropical Storm Stan hit Guatemala, the government-led reconstruction process included consulting the Panabaj and Tz'anchaj communities in selecting a new site and designing houses, ensuring communities' social and cultural priorities were reflected (Supplementary Table 2, Example 14).

The social contract is at the heart of the humanitarian questions surrounding Self Reliance cases. For example, the US government has some obligation to the people of Newtok, Kivalina and Shishmaref (Supplementary Table 2, Example 24), but do those obligations include resettlement when the official analysis suggests it is not in the taxpayers' interest? What if the village locations were largely determined by US government decisions? Such questions will likely become prominent as more communities face increasing risks and confront resettlement.

Future implications for managed retreat

In decades to come, physical and social drivers will shift actuarial and perceived risk levels. For instance, changes in extreme precipitation and sea level rise can increase the likelihood of flooding. For both climatic and non-climatic hazards, risks can also be altered by new policies shaping, for example, flood insurance or lifestyle. For the Alaskan villages, the government-mandated stationary lifestyle reduced mobility and increased vulnerability to coastal hazards²⁹. Where perceived risk levels are rising, support for retreat from residents and/or implementing parties is likely to rise as well.

Mutual Agreement situations offer opportunities for both parties to achieve their objectives through managed retreat. To date, Mutual Agreement has been largely limited to post-disaster settings, when perceived risk is high and significant capital is invested in reconstruction. Enabling pre-disaster managed retreat, however, may boost local input and ownership by eliminating the time pressure of post-disaster settings³⁷. Identifying Mutual Agreement settings requires the implementing party to monitor changing risk levels, both actuarial and perceived, to delineate where and when




Figure 3 | Key characteristics of each quadrant in the managed-retreat conceptual model. The two axes represent the residents' initial desire to move and the scale of beneficiaries. Political will, societal benefit–cost ratio, and likelihood of occurrence stem from those two factors.

retreat might be encouraged or required. For example, in high-risk areas, a local government may implement regulations that facilitate the eventual removal of structures, for instance by permitting development only for the next twenty years or until the shoreline migrates to a certain point.

If residents are initially unwilling to leave, Greater Good situations may require implementing parties to incentivize retreat. In these cases, developing interventions as a move to opportunity, rather than a move from the familiar, may improve residents' willingness to move. Creating options for communities to stay together and select resettlement locations, as in Sendai after the Great East Japan Earthquake, can preserve social capital and shared identity, increasing the appeal of resettlement (Supplementary Table 2, Example 2)³⁸. Those who perceive economic opportunities in resettlement locations, particularly younger residents, have more positive attitudes toward retreat^{39,40}. Combining managed retreat with urban regeneration or densification goals embeds resettlement in broader development projects and may improve its social feasibility.

Climate change has been asserted prominently as a driver of Self Reliance cases, and these same cases have been the least effective in relocating targeted populations. Although supporting individuals and households to reduce their reliance on external resources will help avoid these situations, there are likely to be communities that require assistance to move together and preserve their existing networks. Conflicting values and beliefs can create severely misaligned perspectives between parties, inhibiting progress. For example, implementing parties that value economic

efficiency may refuse to support managed retreat regardless of the attitude of residents. Further, some of these cases encounter deep, fundamental problems associated with sovereign rights and environmental justice. Empowering these locally led efforts requires reducing political obstacles to retreat—for instance, by making resources available in pre-disaster settings²⁹.

Resource mobilization is of particular concern for managed retreat given its high upfront costs. On the basis of limited available data, the financial cost of managed retreat (to implementing parties) varies from well over \$100,000 per person (Alaskan villages and Isle de Jean Charles) to under \$10,000 per person (Fiji and UK Coastal Change Pathfinder). Financial constraints are already forcing governments to re-evaluate the choice to rebuild after disasters, and this dynamic is likely to intensify over time⁴¹. In the US, however, 'no comprehensive governance framework exists that can evaluate when communities and government agencies need to shift their work from protection in place to community relocation'²⁹. Elsewhere, discussions are beginning to take place. In the Federated States of Micronesia, Kosrae has proactively adopted a managed-retreat strategy to redirect development inland⁴². The UK's Shoreline Management Plans have identified locations where the current 'Hold the Line' strategy will no longer be the preferred strategy in the future; retreat—either managed by a government agency or not—is likely to take place⁴³.

Additional research is required to understand the conditions under which managed retreat should be implemented and how to implement it most effectively across diverse contexts. To improve evaluation of managed retreat, future studies could explore how



Figure 4 | Images of managed retreat. **a**, Completed managed realignment scheme at Chowder Ness, UK. The previous coastal defense has been breached, with a new one constructed inland. **b**, An empty lot where a home once stood in Oakwood Beach, New York. Approximately 80% of Oakwood Beach accepted buyouts from the US government after Hurricane Sandy. **c**, A sign demarcating the 'No Build Zone' in the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan. **d**, Infrastructure damage in Shishmaref, Alaska. Shishmaref is one of several Alaskan villages that has been trying to relocate with little success. Images are reproduced with permission from Associated British Ports (**a**), Nathan Kensinger 2017 (**b**), Veejay Villafranca (**c**) and Ned Rozell (**d**).

economic efficiency criteria can be integrated with attachment to place, heritage, and other social dimensions in decision-making. Such research could also help resolve discrepancies between the perspectives of implementing agencies and residents. Another topic for future research is identifying how attitudes toward managed retreat change with increasing natural hazard risk, which could suggest whether Mutual Agreement managed retreat is likely to become an opportunity in high-risk locales, or whether Greater Good interventions will be necessary. Finally, research exploring novel implementations of managed retreat, such as in pre-disaster voluntary settings, can identify new solutions to thorny social, political and financial barriers. Over years to come, effectively tapping managed retreat will necessitate new approaches for managing trade-offs and facilitating inclusive decision-making. The requisite dialogues and innovations stretch from village scales to international cooperation aiming to keep climate change and its unavoidable damages in check.

Methods

Methods, including statements of data availability and any associated accession codes and references, are available in the [online version of this paper](#).

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Author contributions

M.H., K.J.M. and C.B.F. conceived the research and developed the conceptual model. M.H. collected and analysed data. M.H. wrote the paper with discussions with and inputs from K.J.M. and C.B.F.

Additional information

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Competing financial interests

The authors declare no competing financial interests.

Methods

Search strategy and selection criteria. We define managed retreat as the strategic relocation of structures or abandonment of land to manage natural hazard risk. However, such actions are often called other terms based on their context; relevant phrases include ‘community relocation,’ ‘climate displacement,’ ‘island abandonment’ and ‘planned resettlement.’ Each phrase was applied in Web of Science searches. References listed in those papers were used to identify additional cases. To supplement the peer-reviewed literature, a broader internet search was conducted with the same search terms, but only the top ~100 results from those searches were reviewed given the volume of results returned. Searches were conducted in early 2016.

Results were filtered based on fulfilment of the following criteria: the permanent abandonment of land or relocation of people or assets was initiated, not just planned; the action was primarily motivated by natural hazard risk; and it was ‘managed’—that is, it was a deliberate intervention involving two or more parties. The first criterion eliminated studies that, for example, surveyed residents for attitudes toward managed retreat or conducted biophysical or economic analyses of a potential managed-retreat intervention—without actual initiation of retreat. The second criterion eliminated other types of resettlement, such as those driven by infrastructure development. The third criterion eliminated autonomous migration or post-disaster forced displacement in which only the individuals or households moving played a role; given the relevance of autonomous environmental migration, we visualize it within our conceptual model but do not examine it in depth. The third criterion also eliminated managed retreat of assets that had virtually no effect on any other party, such as a landowner relocating a parking lot on their own property, in which only the perspective of the implementing party is relevant.

Once cases were identified, a subsequent search specific to each case was conducted to track down the most recent information on the intervention, such as the number of people or households relocated as part of the intervention.

Comparative analysis and conceptual model development. After the 27 cases were identified, several distinct clusters of interventions emerged inductively, such as the numerous examples of post-disaster mandatory relocations and locally driven relocation efforts. We sought to identify criteria that could comprehensively map the identified cases while reflecting fundamental differences among clusters. These factors, such as developed versus developing country, pre-disaster versus post-disaster, and rapid-onset versus slow-onset natural hazard, were identified from case-specific findings of their importance^{22,29}. We gathered data on the variables of interest for each case to enable systematic comparison among them¹⁹. The conceptual model was developed from a comparative analysis of the cases reviewed. Through iterations of model development, it became clear that these managed-retreat processes were, most fundamentally, two-party decisions and negotiations, each taking place in a unique setting. Therefore, we chose to structure the model based on the motivations of the parties interacting in retreat processes.

Data availability. All data used in this study are available in the sources cited in the references sections of the main manuscript and the Supplementary Information. All estimations performed in Supplementary Table 1 are explained in the Notes column, and the analysis underpinning each entry in Supplementary Table 2 is explained in the Supplementary Information.